Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Justifies the Model? by Alican, Necip Fikri
 DIALOGUE 
AND                                                     
UNIVERSALISM 
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR UNIVERSAL DIALOGUE 
Vol. XXX                     No. 1/2020 
  
PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF CRISIS:  
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS  
PART IV 
 
PAST PHILOSOPHY FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE  
Kevin M. Brien — Toward a Critical Synthesis of the Aristotelian and Confucian Doctrines  
of the Mean  
T. Brian Mooney, Damini Roy — Politeness and Pietas as Annexed to the Virtue of Justice  
Robert Elliott Allinson — The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, Edmund 
Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius: A Perennial Problem for Philosophers?  
Dávid Kollár, József Kollár —  The Art of Shipwrecking: The Information Society and the 
Rise of Exaptive Resilience  
Andrey I. Matsyna  — “Natural Work” as Self-capability: Remaining Human in the Era  
of Turmoil. In Memory of Grigory Savvich Skovoroda  
 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE CURRENT HUMAN PROBLEMS   
Omer Moussaly — The Lessons of Gramsci’s Philosophy of Praxis  
Shuang Zhang — Critique of Capital in the Era of Globalization  
Stanisław Czerniak — Around Richard Münch’s Academic Capitalism Theory  
Necip Fikri Alican  — Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Justifies the Model?  
Henryk Krawczyk, Andrew Targowski — A Universal Theory of Wisdom. A Mind-oriented 
Approach  
Jonathan O. Chimakonam — Are Digital Technologies Transforming Humanity and Making 
Politics Impossible?  
 
 
Published three times a year by 
INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE POLISH ACADEMY  
OF SCIENCES and PHILOSOPHY FOR DIALOGUE FOUNDATION 
   
PL ISSN 1234-5792 
  
ADVISORY COUNCIL  
OF DIALOGUE AND UNIVERSALISM 
 
CHAIRMAN: Leszek Kuźnicki (Poland) — biologist, former President  
of the Polish Academy of Sciences 
 
  Robert Elliott Allinson (USA) — professor of philosophy, Soka University of 
America, former Fellow, University of Oxford, Yale University, Erskine Fellow, 
University of Canterbury, present President of the ISUD 
 Gernot Bőhme (Germany) —  philosopher, Institut  für Praxis der Philosophie 
(Darmstadt) 
 Kevin M. Brien (USA) —  philosopher, Washington College in Maryland 
 Charles Brown (USA) — philosopher, Emporia State University, former President 
of the ISUD 
 Manjulika Ghosh (India) — philosopher, former professor of philosophy, 
University of North Bengal, University Grants Committee emeritus fellow  
 Steven V. Hicks (USA) — philosopher, former President of the ISUD, Director of 
the School of  Humanities and Social Sciences, the Behrend College of Pennsyl-
vania State University 
 Victor J. Krebs (Peru) — professor of philosophy,  Department of Humanities, 
Pontifical Catholic University of Peru   
 Werner Krieglstein (USA) — professor of philosophy (emeritus), College of 
DuPage, director, writer, speaker 
 Ervin Laszlo (Hungary) — philosopher, President of the Budapest Club; Rector of 
the Vienna Academy of the Study of the Future; Science advisor to the Director-
General of UNESCO 
 Michael H. Mitias (USA) — professor of philosophy, Millsaps College, Jackson, 
Mississippi; former President of the ISUD 
 Evanghelos Moutsopoulos (Greece) — philosopher, former Rector of the 
University of Athens  
 Kuniko Myianaga  (Japan) — anthropologist, founding Director of the Human 
Potential Institute (Tokyo); International Christian University (Tokyo) 
 Józef Niżnik (Poland) — professor of philosophy, Institute of Philosophy and 
Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, former president of the Polish 
Foundation for the  Club of Rome 
 John Rensenbrink (USA) —  philosopher, co-founder of the Green Party of the 
United States, former President of the ISUD 
 Andrew Targowski (USA) — professor of computer information systems, Western 
Michigan University, former president of International Society for the 
Comparative Study of Civilizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIALOGUE 
AND 
UNIVERSALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/2020 
  
 
EXECUTIVE EDITORIAL BOARD  
 
 
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: MAŁGORZATA CZARNOCKA  
(Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland)  
   
Robert Elliott Allinson (Soka University, USA) 
Charles Brown (Emporia State University, USA) 
Stanisław Czerniak (Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland) 
Józef L. Krakowiak (University of Warsaw, Poland) 
Emily Tajsin (Kazan State University of Power Engineering, Russia) 
  
                             ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITORS: Maciej Bańkowski, Jack Hutchens 
TYPE-SETTING: Jadwiga Pokorzyńska 
WEBSITE: Mariusz Mazurek 
 
___________ 
 
The annual subscription (paper copies) rates are: 
 
Individuals – 50 EUR  
Institutions – 70 EUR 
 
Single copies are available at 18 EUR each for individuals and 27 EUR for institutions;  
some back issue rates are available on request.  
 
All correspondence concerning the subscription of paper copies should be sent to:  
 
Dialogue and Universalism Office: dialogueanduniversalism@ifispan.waw.pl 
or to: Ars Polona: agnieszka.morawska@arspolona.com.pl  
(regular mail: Ars Polona S.A., ul. Obrońców 25, 03–933 Warszawa, Poland)  
 
Dialogue and Universalism electronic PDF copies are distributed by: 
Dialogue and Universalism Office, email: dialogueanduniversalism@ifispan.waw.pl;  
the Philosophy Documentation Center: order [@] pdcnet.org; and by Central and Eastern 
European Online Library (CEEOL) 
 
All editorial correspondence and submissions should be addressed to: 
e-mail: dialogueanduniversalism@ifispan.waw.pl; or: mczarnoc@ifispan.waw.pl  
(regular mail: Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00–330 Warszawa, Poland)  
 
More information on Dialogue and Universalism may be found on its website:  
http://www.dialogueanduniversalism.eu  
 
 
 
 
Printed by Drukarnia Paper & Tinta, Warszawa 
 
DIALOGUE AND UNIVERSALISM 
No. 1/2020 
 
 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF CRISIS:  
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 
 
PART IV 
 
 
Editorial  ..................................................................................................................   5 
 
PAST PHILOSOPHY FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
Kevin M. Brien — Toward a Critical Synthesis of the Aristotelian and Confucian 
Doctrines of the Mean  .......................................................................................   9 
T. Brian Mooney, Damini Roy — Politeness and Pietas as Annexed to the Virtue  
of Justice  ...........................................................................................................  37 
Robert Elliott Allinson — The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, 
Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius: A Perennial Problem  
for Philosophers?  ..............................................................................................  57 
Dávid Kollár, József Kollár — The Art of Shipwrecking: The Information  
Society and the Rise of Exaptive Resilience  ....................................................  67 
Mitchell Atkinson III — Parsimony and Ontological Control: Quine and 
Wittgenstein on the Size of the World  ..............................................................  85 
Andrey I. Matsyna  — “Natural Work” as Self-capability: Remaining Human in  
the Era of Turmoil. In Memory of Grigory Savvich Skovoroda  ..................... 105 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND CURRENT HUMAN PROBLEMS  
 
Omer Moussaly — The Lessons of Gramsci’s Philosophy of Praxis  ................... 119 
Shuang Zhang — Critique of Capital in the Era of Globalization  ........................ 139 
Stanisław Czerniak — Around Richard Münch’s Academic Capitalism Theory  . 153 
Necip Fikri Alican  — Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly 
Justifies the Model?  ......................................................................................... 171 
Henryk Krawczyk, Andrew Targowski — A Universal Theory of Wisdom.  
A Mind-oriented Approach  ............................................................................. 191 
Jonathan O. Chimakonam — Are Digital Technologies Transforming Humanity 
and Making Politics Impossible?  ..................................................................... 209 
 
 
 
 
 
DIALOGUE AND UNIVERSALISM 
No. 1/2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Necip Fikri Alican 
 
 
 
RAWLS’S JUSTIFICATION MODEL FOR ETHICS:  
WHAT EXACTLY JUSTIFIES THE MODEL? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is 
also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it 
is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same oppo-
sition. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the 
outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue 
in the same article. This is that solution. It also highlights the problem. 
The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify 
his own moral principles, namely his principles of justice, and that the underlying prob-
lem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatso-
ever, or at least any normatively useful ones. The underlying problem was, and still is, 
the model’s inherent universalism, which is built into the decision procedure through 
design specifications precluding relativism, yet only at the cost of limiting the relevant 
moral principles to generalities that are already widely accepted, thereby rendering the 
procedure at best redundant and very likely vacuous as an ethical justification model. 
These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of champi-
oning a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through  
a justification model that is too universalistic to permit such a bias and possibly also too 
universalistic to permit any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated 
here is to position the decision procedure as a dynamic justification model responsive to 
moral progress, as opposed to a static one indifferent to such progress and equally open 
to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the universalistic design 
and any distinctive or controversial principles, including the ones Rawls himself rec-
ommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress. 
Keywords: Rawls, ethical justification, moral reasoning, principles of justice, moral 
progress. 
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1. EXEGETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Breakthroughs in moral philosophy often come in the form of innovations in 
metatheoretical positions. They also tend to come as contributions to normative 
perspectives. We normally do not expect both from the same person, much less 
from the same work, but that is what we get from Rawls, and not just in one 
work, but as the common denominator of his publication history. 
Rawls has enriched our options in both areas. He has developed new meth-
ods for justifying moral principles, and he has formulated new moral principles. 
Not only has he done both but he has done both simultaneously and repeatedly. 
This has opened up new possibilities in ethical justification while at the same 
time supplying the content thereby justified. 
But does the ethical justification model developed by Rawls justify the  
moral principles advocated by Rawls? Answering that question in the negative 
in a recent article (Alican, 2017), I went even further to suggest that the justifi-
cation model developed by Rawls does not seem to justify any moral principles, 
whether by Rawls or by anyone else, that might possibly be useful in sorting out 
substantive moral problems.1 
My opposition in either case was a qualified stand, with room acknowledged 
for a possible solution, though not with an actual solution submitted for critical 
scrutiny. Here, I present that solution, again with some qualification. 
While this is a defense of Rawls from one perspective, it is a critique of him 
from another. It is a defense in the sense that it responds to the charges in the 
original critique and presents a solution that could conceivably overcome the 
difficulties described there. It is a critique in the sense that the response is not  
a clarification of what Rawls says, or means, or does, but a solution specifying 
what he should have said. 
 
 
2. CRITICAL CONTEXT 
 
Ethical justification in Rawls does not have a specific locus of reference. 
Neither does the matter of the moral principles espoused by Rawls. We can try 
to look at everything he ever wrote or we can make do with the most representa-
tive sample. I did neither in the original article. I was not about to attempt in  
a single sitting a comprehensive analysis of what Rawls had accomplished in  
a lifetime. And I was not quite sure what his most representative work might be, 
but I was certain that enough had been done already with A Theory of Justice, 
whether or not that qualifies as his most representative work. I found Rawls’s 
————————— 
1 These can be either perennial or emerging moral problems. The tough cases that have been 
with us for a while include abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment. Among more recent 
issues, we may cite genetic engineering, stem-cell research, and the moral status of artificial 
agents. 
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thought too dynamic for a timeless snapshot at any particular point in his career. 
My approach was to start from the beginning and to extrapolate from there 
while accounting for subsequent departures and turning points. The beginning  
I chose was his “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (“Outline”).2 
The advantage of starting with a limited scope of that sort is a clear view of 
the connection between the two issues: (1) Does the ethical justification model 
in the “Outline” justify the moral principles in that work?3 (2) Does the ethical 
justification model in the “Outline” justify any moral principles of practical 
import, as opposed to reaffirming universally accepted generalities standing in 
no particular need of justification. The first question asks whether the moral 
principles advocated by Rawls, collectively constituting a conception of justice 
as fairness, are justified by the decision procedure outlined by Rawls.4 The sec-
ond question asks whether specific problems exposed through the first question 
evince a more general difficulty extending beyond the distinctive conception of 
justice as fairness, effectively precluding the justification of normatively useful 
moral principles, and thereby ruling out the possibility of a real impact on moral 
decisions.5 
The reason that universally accepted generalities are in no particular need of 
justification is not so much that they are intrinsically and definitively justified 
as it is that we are in agreement about them. While agreement can indeed be the 
result of justification, or at least a sign of justifiability, it is not conclusive evi-
dence of either. Hardly any justification model worth circulating in print will 
fail to pick out murder (unjust killing) as morally wrong. And such a basic mor-
al judgment—“It is wrong to kill anyone unjustly”—is sure to inform Rawls’s 
own decision procedure, as are other judgments of the same degree of generali-
ty. What we usually want to know, however, is something far more specific, 
such as whether abortion is wrong, capital punishment is permissible, and so on. 
But since we are divided on those issues, and on a good many others like them, 
no corresponding judgment can simply be assumed to be among the “considered 
moral judgments of competent moral judges”—the methodological benchmark 
in the decision procedure of Rawls. Nor can we rely entirely on the most basic 
————————— 
2 While there cannot be too many beginnings for the same thing, legitimate candidates in this 
case include Rawls’s senior thesis (1942) and his dissertation (1950) in addition to his “Outline of 
a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951). 
3 These are the seven moral principles in section 5.5 of the “Outline” (Rawls, 1951, 192–193). 
4 Rawls himself refers to the moral principles in the “Outline” (1951, 192–193) as “principles 
of justice” (191). Marking the inception of his conception of justice as fairness, they are later 
pared down to the more familiar twin principles, with modifications and elucidations provided on 
an ongoing basis: 1957, 653–654; 1958, 165; 1971, 60, 302, cf. 83, 250; or 1999, 53, 266–267, cf. 
72, 220); 1982, 5, cf. 46–55; 1985, 227; 1993, 291, cf. 331–334; 2001, 42. 
5 Strictly speaking, “justice as fairness” emerges with the transition from seven principles in 
1951 (“Outline”) to two principles in 1957/1958 (“Justice as Fairness”). But this is true only of 
the technical term, not of the underlying notion, which Rawls had already developed as he drafted 
the “Outline” (1951, 192–193), where his concern is with “fair decisions on moral issues” (181) 
and with a “fair opportunity for all concerned” (182). 
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moral judgments, which account for the only sort of consensus available in real-
ity. Perhaps a justification model cannot reasonably be expected to take stock of 
every conceivable action or practice that might possibly be wrong, but we do, in 
fact, require assistance with more than generalities regarding which we are nei-
ther confused nor hesitant nor ambivalent. 
Yet that is the extent of the assistance Rawls can ever provide through the 
universalism of his justification model for ethics: Moral principles are justified 
insofar as they explicate moral judgments that coincide with the considered 
moral judgments of competent moral judges (Rawls, 1951, 187–189).6 While 
this may sound eminently reasonable, neither the judgments nor the judges are 
likely to be united around the happy coincidence imagined, unless, of course, 
the system is rigged. Does Rawls say that we must take stock of every single 
judgment by every last judge? No, not in so many words, but a demanding de-
gree of universalism is implicit in the production of a consensus out of a plurali-
ty. The conformity required with the considered moral judgments of competent 
moral judges cannot be achieved through a partial correspondence any more 
than virginity can be maintained through occasional abstinence. The procedure 
requires coincidence with all the considered moral judgments (relevant to the 
context) of all the competent moral judges.7 This may sound overly rigorous, 
but the alternative is inadequate at best: coincidence with some of the consid-
ered moral judgments of some of the competent moral judges. 
The universalism described permeates the entire decision procedure, including 
not just the primary features but also the concomitant definitions, explanations, 
and provisions.8 Rawls stipulates that both considered moral judgments (Rawls, 
1951, 182–183) and reasonable moral principles (Rawls, 1951, 188) must trans-
cend context, thereby making them both, by definition, valid and reliable in all 
circumstances. This anchor to universalism is the crux of the matter: Do the spe-
cific principles advocated by Rawls have a broad enough appeal to satisfy the 
universalism built into the decision procedure? And to take this a step further, 
would any set of serviceable moral principles be likely to have the comprehensive 
appeal required by the universalism built into the decision procedure? 
Any answer must be sensitive to the inherent anchor to universalism, which is 
not only axiomatically present throughout Rawls’s “Outline” but also fully explic-
————————— 
6 Rawls’s decision procedure is simple and elegant. Yet it requires cognizance of the intended 
meanings of technical terms expressed in ordinary language (1951): “considered moral judg-
ments” have seven criteria (181–183), “competent moral judges” have four (178–181), and 
“reasonable moral principles” also four (187–189). Even “explication” comes with an explication 
(184–187). 
7 Competent moral judges will have a variety of considered moral judgments. The “coinci-
dence” required for justification is not a direct correspondence with every judgment in the entire 
spectrum of judgments but with those that are relevant to the matter on hand. This can be stated in 
terms of consistency (or noncontradiction) as well as coincidence. The requirement would then be 
either coincidence with the relevant judgments or consistency with all of them. 
8 See, for example, the various criteria mentioned in footnote 6 above. 
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it in his “stability requirement” for considered moral judgments (Rawls, 1951, 
182–183) and his “reliability requirement” for reasonable moral principles 
(Rawls, 1951, 188). While “stability” and “reliability” are terms I adopted for 
convenience in reference in the original article (Alican, 2017, 119–121), the ref-
erent in either case comes directly from Rawls. Both requirements are about the 
kind of stability or reliability rendering the effectiveness of the relevant judgment 
or principle independent of the corresponding contextual conditions and of any 
personal or cultural preconceptions by the rational agents in those conditions. 
Assessing the feasibility of the stability and reliability invoked requires dis-
tinguishing between considered moral judgments that are shared by (or accepta-
ble to) all competent moral judges and considered moral judgments that are not. 
That distinction is, in fact, meaningless, and that is precisely why it needs to be 
made. It is meaningless because considered moral judgments are, by definition, 
shared by (or acceptable to) all competent moral judges. We need a different 
term for moral judgments that would be “considered moral judgments” save for 
the fact that they are not shared by (or acceptable to) all competent moral judg-
es. Let us call them “sensible moral judgments.” Hence, sensible moral judg-
ments are (analogous to) considered moral judgments that do not satisfy the 
stability requirement and are therefore qualified in every way except universal 
appeal.9 From the opposite perspective, considered moral judgments are (analo-
gous to) sensible moral judgments shared by (or acceptable to) all competent 
moral judges. 
Working with this distinction, my position in the original article was that the 
moral principles Rawls presents in his “Outline” do not explicate moral judgments 
that coincide with the considered moral judgments of competent moral judges 
(Rawls, 1951, 187–189). Their coincidence is at best with sensible moral  
judgments, thus falling short of universal appeal. The evidence against Rawls  
is the sheer extravagance of presuming universal appeal for such distinctively  
liberal moral principles as he espouses, specifically his principles of justice as fair-
ness. 
This reference to the liberalism of Rawls is not an ad hominem generaliza-
tion reducing his moral, social, and political philosophy to a polemical position. 
It is a direct reference to how he presents his own position.10 The principles in 
question represent a moral, social, and political outlook (a “liberal” one, to hon-
or the designation Rawls uses) that is both reasonable and appealing but incon-
————————— 
9 The point of the parenthetical qualification invoking analogic comparison is to avoid what 
would otherwise be a misleading construal of sensible moral judgments as a type of considered 
moral judgment, which they cannot be, given their failure to satisfy the stability requirement, 
satisfied without exception by considered moral judgments. Some degree of qualification seems 
appropriate in the opposite direction as well because of the derivative nature of sensible moral 
judgments in relation to the considered moral judgments of Rawls. 
10 The liberalism I attribute to Rawls is the liberalism he claims for himself: 1985, 245–251; 
1987, 1–25, especially 18, including note 27; 1993, 6, 156–158, 233; 2001, 104–106, 148–150, 
153–157, 189–192. 
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sistent with equally reasonable and appealing alternatives.11 And the same evi-
dence undermines the possibility, or weakens the likelihood, of bringing compe-
tent moral judges together on any moral principles, or on any that would be 
useful in moral deliberation, or at least on a sufficiently good many to support  
a moral life, one that is not left unexamined. 
If Rawls’s moral principles are too liberal for his anchor to universalism, 
others may be too conservative, or perhaps not conservative enough, or possibly 
not liberal enough. Moral insight with universal appeal is not likely to be very 
helpful either, as it is typically limited to easy cases: no killing (without just 
cause), no lying (without just cause), and so on. The immediate result is a dis-
crepancy between Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics and his principles of 
justice. His universalistic decision procedure is too objective to accommodate 
his liberal principles. Since there seems to be nothing patently wrong with 
Rawls’s principles of justice, apart from their liberal orientation not being con-
sistent with the objectivity promised, one wonders whether any moral principles 
at all, or any normatively useful ones, can be justified by a decision procedure 
failing to justify Rawls’s apparently reasonable principles of justice. 
This seems to leave Rawls with dogmatic moral principles and a vacuous or 
otiose decision procedure. This is not a palatable outcome. Yet it is also not 
without support. With a figure like Rawls, one wants to invoke the principle of 
charity wherever possible. It is possible here. But we must step outside the dy-
namics of the decision procedure and the particular principles used in the origi-
nal test run. Those principles are just not justified by that procedure. It is too 
much to expect all competent moral judges to be on board with moral principles 
that represent or define a moral or sociopolitical platform that is liable to attract 
as many detractors as supporters.12 Quite possibly, and for the same reason, no 
useful principles at all might be justified by that procedure, or not enough of 
them, at any rate. The evidence is not irrefutable, but the consequences, poten-
tial though they may be, present too great an obstacle to rest easy. 
Neither the problems exposed in the original article nor the solution devel-
oped in the next section is limited to the seminal “Outline” of 1951, which 
serves only as a medium for a case study demonstrating serious difficulties that 
would otherwise amount to little more than vague impressions. In the original 
article, I presented evidence of the generalization of the relevant problems 
————————— 
11 To be precise, Rawls takes justice as fairness to be a political conception, never explicitly 
identifying it as part of a “comprehensive moral doctrine” (cf. Rawls, 1985; 1987; 1988). I do not 
mean to contradict this. I mean only to note that justice as fairness is a liberal conception, as 
Rawls himself asserts (e.g., Rawls, 1987, 17–22; 1993, 3–46, 144–168), whether it is classified as 
a moral conception or as a political one, and whether, in either case, it is “comprehensive” or not. 
12 This is not a quantitative assessment. The number of detractors need not equal the number of 
supporters for there to be a problem. The point is qualitative: Not everyone will be on board with 
“liberal” principles, as Rawls himself calls them. See the preceding two notes (notes 10, 11) for  
a representative list of where he actually calls them that. 
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across Rawls’s evolving understanding of justification in ethics and through all 
formulations of his principles of justice.13 Here, I focus only on the solution. 
 
 
3. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
 
The solution I propose is the establishment of moral progress as the reason 
why Rawls’s moral principles trump competing moral principles. To be clear, 
the same approach could work just as well for competing moral principles. I am 
not saying that Rawls’s principles of justice indubitably represent progress over 
all actual and imaginable alternatives. I am saying only that this is a legitimate 
appeal for any moral principles, whether by Rawls or by others, that happen to 
fall short of universal coincidence with the considered moral judgments of 
competent moral judges. The strategy would obviously need to include not just 
this appeal, basically an unsubstantiated claim, but also an accompanying ra-
tionale for its validity, as discussed further in subsections 4.2 and 4.3. 
Such an appeal to moral progress, including the accompanying justification, 
can be used to connect the decision procedure to the mindset or outlook repre-
senting the postulated progress, so that the justification mechanism is no longer 
a generic algorithm but a decision procedure indexed to a well-defined group or 
community, one where sufficient progress has already taken place. Our best 
candidate for that, as Rawls keeps reminding us, is a Western democracy. 
The first step is to relax the deceptively rigorous universalism suffocating 
the decision procedure.14 One way of doing that is to associate the evaluation 
mechanism (the judges, the judgments, and so on) with a particular culture dur-
ing a particular period, preferably with the morally most advanced position at 
present, if we can identify what that is as easily and as surely as Rawls seems to 
be able to do. That is more practicable than leaving the entire platform adrift in 
the moral universe, where the sources of appeal remain endless. What worked 
for Athens in the age of Pericles, for example, is unlikely to work for Sweden or 
Switzerland today, and what works for Sweden or Switzerland may not work 
for Iran or India. 
Relaxing the universalism in recognition of moral progress should alleviate 
the discrepancy created by a dogmatic outcome. Tapping the decision procedure 
————————— 
13 I do not claim to have put together conclusive evidence of the susceptibility of each and 
every one of Rawls’s later works to the problems in the “Outline” of 1951. Nor was this the claim 
in the original article (Alican, 2017). My position has always been that the problems discussed 
here are apparent everywhere in Rawls, and that this appearance, supported by corroborating 
evidence in the original article, provides sufficient motivation to take the matter seriously enough 
to seek a solution, even without incontrovertible proof of the universal range and relevance of the 
problem. 
14 The suffocation comes specifically from Rawls’s “stability requirement” for considered 
moral judgments (Rawls, 1951, 182–183) and his “reliability requirement” for reasonable moral 
principles (188), both identified as such earlier in the main text. 
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for a conception of justice as fairness would then cease to be a transgression of 
the model’s design specifications so long as the reconciliation of universalism 
with dogmatism favors the shared ideals of constitutional democracies repre-
sentative of the Western world, or more generally, so long as the mutual rea-
lignment weeds out contingencies inimical to justice as fairness. This is not to 
say that such a realignment is itself fair, or morally acceptable, but that it would 
eliminate the inconsistency (manifested at present as a manipulation of the 
model) between the universal configuration of the original decision procedure 
and the dogmatic recommendation of justice as fairness. 
This is a promising step because the obstacle to consensus in Rawls’s theo-
retical framework is the accretion of cultural and temporal differences coalesc-
ing into an ideological discordance in the system. Embracing the global matrix 
of moral judgments all at once would be an exercise in futility in the absence of 
adequate convergence. Acknowledging the discordant constituents to be distrib-
utively valid, each in its proper context, would be relativism. On the other hand, 
the universalism introduced by default through the requirement of widespread 
consensus is liable to leave us with no justification at all, given that an inclusive 
consensus out of divergent views may well turn out to be either superficial or 
altogether impossible. 
The reason why the recommendation is only to relax and not to eliminate the 
universalism is that the elimination of universalism suggests submission to rela-
tivism, whereas the proposed solution is to index the decision procedure to  
a reference group representing moral progress and thereby providing an objec-
tive basis and rational grounds for vindicating the apparent dogmatism. 
The choice of relaxation over elimination may appear to be something of  
a compromise, but that would be a misconception. Relaxing the scope of uni-
versalism may, for example, be interpreted as admitting a certain degree of rela-
tivism into the decision procedure, while stopping short of fully eliminating the 
universalism may be thought to consign the system to dogmatism, namely the 
dogmatism of proceeding with the reference group favoring Rawlsian liberal-
ism. This is a false dilemma presenting the realignment as suffering from rela-
tivism while at the same time engaging in dogmatism. What may look like 
dogmatism is legitimized through the appeal to moral progress. The reason that 
it may still look like dogmatism is that it is the same position that is indeed 
dogmatic in the absence of indexation to moral progress. The realignment adds 
the missing justification to an otherwise arbitrary choice among others with an 
equal claim to consistency with the relevant judgments of the proper judges. 
The realignment does not dispense with universalism. Moral principles are 
still justified only insofar as they explicate the considered moral judgments of 
competent moral judges, but those are now linked to a morally enlightened ref-
erence group. The modified decision procedure continues to acknowledge the 
prevalence of cultural and ideological differences throughout the general popu-
lation. It neither emphasizes nor suppresses such differences any more than the 
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unmodified version. As cultural or ideological differences arise, any judgments 
in polar opposition remain outside the common ground of universal relevance, 
just as they do in the original model, while the resulting consensus transcends 
cultures and ideologies, no more or less than can reasonably be expected in the 
original model. The difference is in the recognition that the approach is dogmat-
ic, and remains dogmatic, without the appeal to moral progress. 
This is not a magical solution. As stated earlier, the appeal to moral progress, 
if it is to work at all, cannot be left as a mere appeal. Declaring moral progress 
to favor a certain position or platform is no better than skipping the façade of 
justification altogether and proclaiming the validity or superiority of the rele-
vant position or platform. The progress claimed for the position favored re-
quires proof. Otherwise, it is a declaration rather than a demonstration. 
Yet there can be no proof here in the strictest sense of the term, just as there 
can be no proof that the relevant moral principles really do, as Rawls insists, 
coincide with the considered moral judgments of competent moral judges 
(Rawls, 1951, 187–189). Even so, the appeal to moral progress is no weaker in 
terms of evidentiary value than the connection Rawls makes in any of his works 
between the ethical justification model he submits for consideration and the 
moral principles he recommends for adoption. 
Rawls never actually “proves” in any commonly acceptable sense that his 
moral principles are justified by his decision procedure. He merely asserts that 
they are. To be specific, he claims that they are such principles as would be 
adopted by reasonable persons working toward a mutually acceptable solution.15 
Finding or forging a connection between Rawls’s position and moral progress, 
as recommended in this article, requires no greater a leap of faith than does the 
original appeal of Rawls. The difference is that the approach here adds the pro-
spect of justification whereas Rawls’s own efforts limit him to dogmatism. 
In his later works, as in “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” 
(1985), Rawls himself relaxes the universalism of his decision procedure and 
openly anchors his principles of justice to a society operating within the frame-
work of a modern constitutional democracy. That makes it tempting to conclude 
that the recommendation in the present article must be good because Rawls 
gravitates toward something similar to it in his later thought. But that would be 
to beg the question with an apparently relevant but ultimately illicit appeal to 
authority. A more convincing approach would be to stay within the realm of the 
“Outline” to capitalize on Rawls’s analogy there between ethics and science: 
 
“For to say of scientific knowledge that it is objective is to say that the prop-
ositions expressed therein may be evidenced to be true by a reasonable and 
————————— 
15 No matter how sophisticated the model, the justification associated with the decision 
procedure is a claim rather than a proof. For example, to invoke the imagery of his most famous 
model, we really have nothing to go by except Rawls’s assurance (supported by our own 
sensibilities if we happen to agree) that contractors working out a reflective equilibrium from the 
original position would end up with the principles Rawls says they would. 
180 Necip Fikri Alican 
reliable method, that is, by the rules and procedures of what we may call ‘in-
ductive logic’; and, similarly, to establish the objectivity of moral rules, and 
the decisions based upon them, we must exhibit the decision procedure, 
which can be shown to be both reasonable and reliable, at least in some cas-
es, for deciding between moral rules and lines of conduct consequent to 
them” (Rawls, 1951, 177, cf. 189–190, 194–196). 
 
This is the perfect place to incorporate moral progress. But there are difficul-
ties. The notion of moral progress is itself complicated.16 Scholarly disagree-
ment persists not only in defining and measuring moral progress but also in 
ascertaining whether any has taken place so far, and indeed, whether such pro-
gress is likely, or even possible at all.17 Moreover, scientists have effectively 
taken over the field, practically displacing moral philosophers, though perhaps 
not neurophilosophers. As a result, the justifiability of moral enhancement, for 
example, an outgrowth of the question of moral progress in the face of rapidly 
advancing technology, has become a hotly debated topic. 
Yet the underlying issue of moral progress is not a new problem. The discus-
sion was well underway among the Stoics, or to narrow down the reference, in 
the discourses of Epictetus. The secondary literature today is replete with refer-
ences to this or that philosopher’s conception of moral progress, with particular 
recourse to the thought of Kant and Dewey, the first mainly in defensive ap-
proaches denying any neglect or inconsistency in Kant, and the second mostly 
in constructive approaches building on the original contributions of Dewey.18 
Much of this is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, some discus-
sion is in order since moral progress is an integral part of the salvage operation 
contemplated here for the decision procedure of Rawls. That discussion pro-
ceeds, however, not from a particular perspective but with a general account 
(see especially subsection 4.1) setting aside metatheoretical issues concerning 
the possibility and reality of moral progress itself. 
————————— 
16 The secondary literature, already vast, has been growing and diversifying rapidly in recent 
years. The following is a sampling: (Anderson-Gold, 2001; Buchanan, Powell, 2015; Dixon, 
2005; Godlovitch, 1998; Hodges, 1968; 1971; Jamieson, 2002; Kleingeld, 1999; Macklin, 1977; 
Moody-Adams, 1999; Moran, 2012; Nussbaum, 2007; Rorty, 1989; 1998; 2007; Singer, 1981; 
Wilson, 2011). 
17 A familiar approach is to take moral progress as a matter of expanding the sphere of moral 
consideration from the self to the universe, that is, to all of creation, with the level of expansion 
current at any time signifying the degree of moral progress prevailing at that time, presumably in 
relation to some initial state, perhaps something along the lines of the “state of nature” of the 
social contract tradition. This, in other words, is the extension of full moral consideration to 
others, typically starting with the family and ending with the world at large, but also breaking 
down the barriers between species, not just those between tribes, nations, or races. Leading 
proponents include, among others, Rorty (1989, 189–198; 1998, 165–243) and Singer (1981). 
18 On Kant, see (Anderson-Gold, 2001; Kleingeld, 1999; Moran, 2012). On Dewey, see (Rorty, 
2007) and the response by Nussbaum (2007). 
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To return to Rawls, an appeal to moral progress requires an admission of 
dogmatism in the decision procedure. This is not necessarily an admission  
of failure. Quite the contrary, it is a precaution against failure. The unacknowl-
edged dogmatism that is there anyway must be replaced with legitimate indexa-
tion. That is where the argument from moral progress comes in. Such an argu-
ment would have to establish that Rawls’s moral principles trump alternatives 
because they represent moral progress relative to the alternatives. The task at 
present is not to prove that conclusion but to demonstrate that the attempt is 
necessary.19 
Given that Rawls himself is in pursuit of relevant parallels between ethical and 
scientific reasoning, the appeal to moral progress would be a fitting response to 
the charges of dogmatism. If scientific principles can vary over time and across 
scientific communities, and if scientific progress can still proceed without being 
undermined either by dogmatism or by relativism, why should differences in 
moral judgments and in moral principles over time and across cultures be so dis-
concerting? Why can we not praise Rawls’s principles of justice as the result of 
moral progress instead of condemning them as a product of dogmatism? 
Rawls’s principles of justice are dogmatic at least in the sense that they are 
firmly grounded in the values he associates with a typical, or preferably ideal, 
contemporary Western democracy. The argument from moral progress makes 
this defensible. The very possibility of moral progress suggests that some posi-
tions are more tenable than others. Rawls’s position may well be at the head of 
the list, or it may not, there being no guarantee either way. Any apparent dog-
matism could, in the event of a positive match, be validated as a result of the 
corresponding progress. 
This is a solution that suggested itself together with the charges in the origi-
nal article: anchoring the ethical justification model, including but not limited to 
the decision procedure of 1951, to a community of morally enlightened judges 
with morally advanced judgments, and consequently establishing Rawls’s prin-
ciples of justice in any rendition, and thereby his conception of justice as fair-
ness, as the product of moral progress. The remainder of the present article is 
devoted to the anticipation of likely objections and the formulation of reasona-
ble responses. 
 
 
4. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
 
Three objections come to mind. The first is that the universalism of Rawls’s 
decision procedure, even after relaxation as recommended here, leaves the mod-
el incompatible with variation or change, thus precluding the possibility of  
moral progress. The second is that, even if Rawls’s decision procedure could 
————————— 
19 Any such argument would have to be supported by a separate argument, or at least by an 
assumption (explicit or implicit), that progress in morality is both possible and desirable. 
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accommodate moral progress, further argumentation would be necessary to 
establish that the moral principles he associates with Western democracies do in 
fact represent progress over those in other distinctive groups, say, the principles 
prevailing in Athens during the age of Pericles, or the entirely different set in 
effect in Iran at present, or the common core operative in India throughout its 
history. The third is that, even if Rawls’s moral principles represent progress 
over those of ancient cultures as well as over those of current autocracies, theoc-
racies, and caste systems, the argument from moral progress does not seem to 
address the possibility of conflict or disagreement within the favored group, that 
is, competent moral judges born and raised in a Western metropolis and flour-
ishing there today. 
 
4.1. Suppression of further progress 
 
The first objection questions the compatibility of ethical universalism with 
moral progress. The charge is that the elements of universalism in the decision 
procedure, namely the stability requirement for considered moral judgments and 
the reliability requirement for reasonable moral principles, indicate finality and 
thereby preclude progress. Given that the recommendation is to relax the uni-
versalism, it may seem that the objection is irrelevant. Yet it is not. Rawls is 
right to insist on some type of stability and reliability. What is to be relaxed is 
the universalism that binds his decision procedure to the judgments of compe-
tent moral judges without restriction, which leaves it open to all judges in all 
cultures through all time. But even when this sweeping universalism is relaxed, 
there will still be room for universalism within the representative population of 
judges and judgments, thus sustaining the relevance of the objection. 
Any response would do well to consider precisely what is involved in pro-
gress in general and in moral progress in particular.20 Progress is best mapped 
out in two dimensions, using both descriptive and normative factors. The first 
dimension calls for a description of the relevant trend or pattern, measured  
either as a growing difference from an initial state or as a growing similarity to  
a final state. For example, progress in software design is routinely expressed in 
terms of differences from an initial state (often released with a version number 
such as 1.0 accompanying the brand name), while progress in pest control is 
typically assessed in relation to a targeted goal or ideal final state (the complete 
extermination of specified pests in designated areas). The case of moral pro-
gress seems closer to the example of software design than to that of pest control 
because, for comparisons with the present state, the initial state of morality 
(perhaps the state of nature) is more readily accessible than the final state. This 
————————— 
20 The account here draws liberally on the work of Mayo (1986, 86–95), not because it is 
unique in the literature, but because it is the inspiration behind my own understanding. I admire 
the way he has untangled the relevant conceptual elements and clarified the corresponding 
methodological issues. 
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holds unless one wishes to argue either that the present state of morality is the 
final state of morality or that the final state of morality can be predicted accu-
rately enough for fruitful comparisons with the present state. The second di-
mension in progress is a normative assessment of the value of the change in 
question. The normative judgment indicates whether the trend depicted is posi-
tive (good) or negative (bad): If it is positive, it is progress. If it is negative, it is 
regress. If it is neither, it is neutral. 
Mapping out moral progress, whether from the descriptive or the normative 
perspective, also requires accounting for the type of change. This points to at 
least three possibilities: changes in moral truths, changes in moral awareness 
(understanding of moral truths), and changes in moral attitudes (adherence to 
moral truths). Ethical universalism and moral progress are mutually inconsistent 
only at the first level, the one concerning changes in moral truths. One cannot 
sensibly hold both that moral truths are universal, or absolute, and that moral 
progress proceeds with changes in moral truths. However, ethical universalism 
and moral progress are quite compatible in connection with either of the other 
two possibilities: People may in time achieve a clearer understanding of un-
changing moral truths, if there are such things, as well as adopting a stricter 
adherence to those truths. 
The progress relevant here is exemplified by the latter two types of change. 
Either one of those, but especially both of them together, will accommodate an 
appeal to moral progress in defense or explanation of the dogmatism in Rawls, 
without any conflict with the universalistic character of his decision procedure. 
As a matter of fact, the Rawlsian system, throughout its various evolutionary 
phases, tacitly draws on the notion of moral progress, as is evident in allowanc-
es for “critical examination” (Rawls, 1951, 188) and “reflective equilibrium” 
(Rawls, 1971, 20–21, 48–53; or 1999, 18–19, 42–46).21 
Undertones of moral progress are especially prominent in Rawls’s mature 
thought, for example, in his appeal to “overlapping consensus,” a process  
envisaged to take several generations (Rawls, 2001, 32–38, 192–195). The as-
sumption is also consistent with his adoption of what he calls the Aristotelian 
Principle (Rawls, 1971, 424–433; or 1999, 372–380]), a principle of human 
motivation postulating a preference for activities that challenge our realized 
abilities and capacities (natural or developed) and that are more complex as 
opposed to simple or less complex. This principle underpins Rawls’s under-
standing of moral psychology in A Theory of Justice (1971, 490–496; or 1999, 
429–434). Moral progress, if it is a fact, can be expected to make increasingly 
greater demands of this sort on our abilities and capacities, and would probably, 
given the associated push toward development, count as a more rather than less 
complex phenomenon (cf. Rawls, 1993, 203, note 35, 207; 2001, 200, note 21). 
————————— 
21 See (Alican, 2017, 130–132, including note 18) for discussion and documentation of 
reflective equilibrium. 
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None of this contradicts the universalism that Rawls employs in his decision 
procedure. Moral progress does not preclude moral truth, but moral principles 
can still be revised, and moral judgments may still vary over time and between 
persons. It is only considered moral judgments that are universal. Subsuming 
Rawls’s moral principles and the notion of sensible moral judgments under the 
awareness and adherence models of change allows for moral progress while 
embracing ethical universalism. On this interpretation, considered moral judg-
ments are Rawls’s moral truths, which remain changeless, while moral progress 
takes place through improvements either in our awareness or in our adherence, 
or in both, as reflected in the transformation of sensible moral judgments into 
considered moral judgments as well as in the revision of moral principles. 
Decoupling awareness and adherence, a possibility left open in the discussion 
so far, particularly in the previous paragraph, may be thought to expose this line 
of defense to ambiguity wherein greater adherence to misunderstood truths may 
count as progress. While awareness and adherence do indeed work better together 
than they do separately, my point is that each one is a mark of moral progress and 
that each would be so even if the other were not. A heightened moral awareness 
(better understanding of moral truths) generalized across the human race, or 
across a meaningful portion of it, is a sign of moral progress, as is a better moral 
attitude (stricter adherence to moral truths), again generalized across a relevant 
group, narrow or broad. If these cannot reasonably be considered severally suffi-
cient conditions of moral progress, especially evident when an improvement in 
one is coupled with a deterioration in the other, I am willing to concede that point. 
My main concern with moral progress is to come up with descriptors that are 
pertinent to the concept. I am open to suggestions and objections. But I doubt that 
any deficiency in the present account is serious enough to preclude moral pro-
gress as a possible explanation for the apparent dogmatism in Rawls’s position. 
It may seem tempting, as an alternative, to dismiss the objection in this sub-
section with an outright denial, arguing that the appeal to moral progress would 
render the problematic elements of the decision procedure progressive, which 
would naturally imply that the progress in question has already taken place, 
whereupon it would become pointless to object that the universalism of the de-
cision procedure is incompatible with moral progress, because it would no 
longer be true, or even relevant, at that point. But that would be to deny or ig-
nore both the possibility and the demands of further progress, which contradicts 
the spirit of the defense offered. 
Moreover, even if the justification model were perfect to begin with, thus 
obviating any need for improvement, and in fact leaving no room for progress, 
the principles Rawls uses as a test case, his principles of justice as fairness, may 
themselves not be perfect. The decision procedure and the principles of justice 
are mutually independent. Moral progress may be invoked in either case, but 
only as separate initiatives. While the first objection was about the decision 
procedure, the next two objections deal with the relevant moral principles. 
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4.2. Proof of progress in Rawls 
 
The second objection concerns the validity of the value judgment in the as-
sessment of moral progress: What makes Rawls’s moral principles more ad-
vanced than others? Why should his moral principles (whether the generically 
“reasonable” ones invoked without specification in the decision procedure or 
the familiar ones specifically recommended by him later) be taken to represent  
a state of morality superior to the one represented by the moral principles preva-
lent in Periclean Athens or in modern-day Tehran or Mumbai? 
The problem with appealing to moral progress for justification, so the objec-
tion goes, is that we do not have a court of appeal for evaluating moral progress 
if we do not yet have an ethical justification model. The evaluation requires  
a decision procedure, which itself happens to be up for evaluation, along with 
the principles. It is circular to declare Rawls’s moral theory superior to another 
by employing principles of selection, or evaluation, originating in Rawls’s own 
moral theory. But it is just as problematic to bring in a third moral theory from 
which to derive independent principles of selection to choose between Rawls’s 
moral theory and the original alternative. The latter is problematic because, in 
that case, it would be necessary to evaluate the principles of selection in the 
third theory as well. This presents two problems. First, if the third theory turns 
out to be better (more advanced) than the other two, then Rawls’s theory would 
not be the best (most advanced) one. Second, to avoid circularity, we would 
need yet another theory to judge the merits of the third one, and so on to infini-
ty. These are important challenges to the argument from moral progress. 
However, despite the apparent paradox of infinite regress, meaningful com-
parisons between moral theories are possible. The fact that different competent 
moral judges have different sensible moral judgments does not mean that the 
judgments are equally acceptable or respectable. Nor does it mean that such 
judgments are explicated by equally useful moral principles. Rather than being 
a problem or obstacle, it is both consistent with and necessary for moral pro-
gress that our moral principles not be identical with those of the ancient Greeks, 
or Vikings, or Visigoths, and so on. We are not supposed to adopt, assimilate, or 
inherit moral principles uncritically. This is anticipated by Rawls himself in the 
second test he prescribes for the reasonableness of moral principles: 
 
“[T]he reasonableness of a principle is tested by seeing whether it shows  
a capacity to become accepted by competent moral judges after they have 
freely weighed its merits by criticism and open discussion, and after each 
thought it over and compared it with his own considered judgments” (Rawls, 
1951, 188). 
 
We must make room for dialogue, both interpersonal and intercultural,  
in addition to an inner monologue of sorts. Only then can we expect moral  
progress. Principles alone are not sufficient for moral education. Moral experi-
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ence, negotiation, and discourse are also needed. Morality is, by and large, dia-
lectical. 
Note that embracing “criticism and open discussion” invites a certain degree 
of subjectivity, which, in turn, gives rise to another question: Are moral truths 
not independent of what people think? Moral truths, if they exist, are indeed 
independent of what people think, but this does not make criticism and open 
discussion inimical to their discovery. Quite the contrary, the process under 
consideration is suitable for ethics as well as science. Neither in ethics nor in 
science do the canons of reasoning that govern theory formation, justification, 
and selection operate independently of the people involved. 
To recall a contemporary of Rawls, we may consider how Thomas Kuhn 
(1977, 320–339), both as a scientist and as a philosopher, reconciles objectivity 
and subjectivity in the process of scientific progress. Any choice between com-
peting scientific theories depends, according to Kuhn, on a mixture of shared 
and individual standards, that is, on a combination of objective and subjective 
criteria.22 Objective criteria play a greater role in justification, while subjective 
criteria play a greater role in discovery, but the context of pedagogy differs al-
most as much from the context of justification as it does from that of discovery. 
Theory selection proceeds with “exemplary crucial experiments” that help pick 
one theory over another, but they are not the sole reason for acceptance. The 
experiments invoked in theory selection are the ones most favorable to the theo-
ry in question, while each theory comes with more as well as less favorable 
experiments, sorted out in accordance with objective and subjective criteria. 
Kuhn’s portrayal of the principles of progress in science supports the analo-
gy Rawls draws between ethics and science. In ethics, too, objective criteria 
play a greater role in the evaluation and justification of theories, while subjec-
tive criteria play a greater role in their conception and formulation. The former 
is the source of objectivity, the latter, of creativity. Objective criteria are pre-
sumably shared by all or nearly all theorists, thus determining the ultimate suc-
cess or failure of any theory. 
In Rawlsian terms, subjective criteria play a greater role in the formulation 
of sensible moral judgments, some of which become considered moral judg-
ments as they are filtered through objective criteria. The counterparts in Rawls 
of “exemplary crucial experiments” in Kuhn are the “principles of selection” 
mentioned above. Just as the scientist chooses from among favorable and unfa-
vorable exemplary crucial experiments, using both objective and subjective 
criteria, the moral theorist uses both objective and subjective criteria to decide 
which principles of selection to employ in theory construction. The element of 
————————— 
22 The shared basis of theory choice includes accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and 
fruitfulness. The individual basis of theory choice includes a scientist’s previous experiences both 
as a scientist (field, experience, school of thought, etc.) and as a human being (personality traits, 
demographic factors, historical background, etc.). 
   Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Justifies the Model? 187 
subjectivity introduced thereby is not detrimental to the argument from moral 
progress, so long as objective criteria dominate the process of justification. 
 
4.3. Progress among contemporaneous positions 
 
The third objection concerns the possibility of conflict among principles that 
happen to be in currency at the same time. How can moral progress still be rele-
vant when we switch from historical to contemporary comparisons where chro-
nology is no longer an issue? An apparent implication here is that even if moral 
progress is a good explanation for why a current position is to be preferred over 
an ancient one, it is not as relevant to a choice between contemporaneous theo-
ries or systems. 
This is a misconstrual of progress. Any one or more of concurrent platforms 
may be more advanced (or less advanced) than any one or more of others in 
comparison to a benchmark state. There is nothing irrelevant about the compar-
ative evaluation of alternative theories in terms of their progress relative to  
a common point of reference even where they have all outgrown the chosen 
reference. The fact that we are no longer competing with the state of nature, for 
example, does not mean that we could not, if we so desired, continue to measure 
progress in reference to it. 
Moral progress is not just consistent with conflict among competing moral 
theories but is in fact dependent on that very conflict. The relevant theories at 
any point in time are all part of the moral progress unfolding at that time. Far 
from blocking progress, conflict actually promotes it. Arguments and counter-
arguments can remain in a standstill for only so long, eventually falling out of 
equilibrium in one direction or the other, and often giving way to fresh perspec-
tives and productive modes of thinking. 
The argument from moral progress does not imply or require the immediate 
or even rapid resolution of all disagreements in belief and attitude. Granted, 
compared to ethics, progress in science has brought greater uniformity in beliefs 
and attitudes. However, most of the scientific progress to date has taken place 
over the last few centuries, whereas we have been struggling with many of the 
same moral problems for millennia, adding quite a few new ones along the way. 
This shows that science has come a long way, not that ethics must stay the same 
as it ever was, forever barred from progress. 
Nor does this assessment of disproportionate progress contradict the history 
of philosophy as exhibiting comparably recent developments in ethical theory. 
No doubt, we now have access to, say, the categorical imperative and the prin-
ciple of utility, two normative decision procedures (or rather the central ele-
ments in them) coinciding in origin with the advances in science giving rise to 
the Industrial Revolution. But such developments in ethical theory have yet to 
generate correlative advances in our moral outlook or disposition. Science has 
less of a lag with technology in that respect. 
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We have been quick, one and all, to assimilate breakthroughs in science, but 
not so quick to do the same with developments in ethics. This may be partly 
because developments in ethics are not perfectly analogous to those in science 
in the first place, but it is mostly because we all “feel” we know the difference 
between right and wrong anyway, whereas we remain relatively receptive to 
what science can teach us about the world around us and beyond. We are will-
ing to admit that we do not know whether there are parallel universes, extra 
dimensions in the fabric of reality, or states of matter we have not yet discov-
ered, and so on. But we are not willing to admit that we might possibly be 
wrong on abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, or anything else of that sort. 
Everyone is a moralist, but not everyone is a scientist. 
The “everyone” here, like the “we” before that, is a reference to human na-
ture as it is commonly manifested, with the manifestation being open to obser-
vation. The generalization that people feel confident in their moral attitudes is 
not meant to suggest that no one could possibly be undecided on a moral prob-
lem. One could certainly suspend judgment on a moral issue after careful con-
sideration with full information. But even that can be done with confidence. The 
point is that ordinary people regularly consider themselves qualified in moral 
discourse, whereas they normally do not have that attitude regarding scientific 
matters. Just about anyone who cares enough would be happy to debate Rawls 
on the moral permissibility of abortion or euthanasia, but hardly anyone who is 
not a theoretical physicist would be chomping at the bit to engage Hawking on 
the radiation output of black holes. 
A present deficiency of progress in ethics, if there is such a deficiency, does 
not condemn morality to relativity, or ethical theory to indeterminism. Progress 
in science, particularly in the natural sciences, overcame various prejudices to 
reach cross-cultural consensus. Comparable progress can be expected in the 
humanities. The persistence of individual and cultural differences does not pre-
clude the development of rational methods toward a progressive resolution. 
Differences could be due to prejudice, ignorance, insensitivity, or misuse of 
rational methods for establishing moral rules, all of which can be overcome in 
time through a Rawlsian “critical examination”—just as they could through any 
other sober system of rational reflection. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Rawls assumes custody of a delicate balance as he embraces universalism to 
avoid relativism in his decision procedure for ethics. Such delicacy comes with 
special problems. Chief among them is the threat to that balance from the dog-
matic promotion of a liberal conception of justice through a decision procedure 
that should, according to its own design specifications, resist any bias in any 
direction in the sociopolitical spectrum. 
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There is nothing inherently wrong with the conception of justice in play, ba-
sically the famous principles of justice (as fairness) in any of their various for-
mulations throughout Rawls’s career, but they just do not look like they have  
a special claim to justification through the decision procedure employed. And 
because there is nothing especially wrong with this conception of justice, the 
problem then appears to be with the decision procedure, which therefore begins 
to look like it might possibly be sterile as an ethical justification model irrele-
vant to anything beyond a readily and widely acceptable backbone of morality 
that does not go far toward assisting moral agents with actual moral problems. 
This is a serious matter but not a decisive obstacle. Rawls can keep his princi-
ples and justify them too. He can conceivably even do so with the same model. 
But he must relax the universalism and validate the dogmatism, which then ceases 
to be dogmatism. The way out, as shown here, is through the equilibrium emerg-
ing in the recalibration of dogmatism as moral progress, including a consequent 
realignment of universalism and dogmatism, with relativism kept safely at bay. 
The only viable option for Rawls, especially in contrast to ignoring the prob-
lem, which is essentially what he does, is to argue that his position is morally 
more advanced than anything contradicting it. The tension between the imple-
mentation of universalism and the adoption of moral principles representative of 
a distinctive sociopolitical platform will not go away on its own. While he never 
acknowledges it as a problem, this is the same tension Rawls silently consigns 
in his later work to sociopolitical tendencies naturally and gradually converging 
around a liberal conception of justice eventually adopted universally as an en-
lightened consensus. That is nothing other than moral progress. 
Without trumpeting it as loudly as he should, then, Rawls himself ends up 
relying on moral progress to prove him right in the end. The strategy of this 
article has been to assert that connection up front as the only way of making 
Rawls right from the beginning. It remains to be shown whether moral progress 
favors the position Rawls holds and supports the justification he proposes, but 
the argument here still leaves Rawls a step ahead of where he otherwise stands 
with liberalism as a deus ex machina and natural sociopolitical developments as 
an imaginary ally that could just as easily favor the opposite position. 
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